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I. INTRODUCTION

After White House Deputy Counsel Vincent Foster, Jr., a close friend
of President Bill Clinton, was found dead with a gun in his hand in a
Washington, D.C. area park in 1993,1 five separate federal investigations
concluded that Foster committed suicide.2 Those findings were questioned
by some murder-conspiracy theorists who claimed foul play. 3 Allan J.
Favish, a skeptical Los Angeles attorney, wanted to conduct an
independent investigation and brought suit under the Freedom of
Information Act ' (FOIA) to request copies of all the death scene and
autopsy photos.5 The government refused to release the pictures, citing
exemption 7(C), the personal privacy provision of the FOIA law
enforcement exemption.6 The government argued that disclosure would
constitute an unwarranted invasion of privacy of Foster's family
members.7
Favish sued to obtain copies of the photographs from the government.8
Favish argued that privacy rights are intended to protect the person about
whom records are sought, that this protection ends with that person's
death, and that exemption 7(C)'s protection does not apply to surviving
family members. 9 In March 2004, a decade after Foster's suicide, the U.S.

1. See, e.g., Thomas L. Friedman, White House Aide Leaves No Clue About Suicide, N.Y.
TIMES, July 22, 1993, at A-i.; Ruth Marcus, ClintonAide Vincent FosterDies in ApparentSuicide,

July 21, 1993, at A-1.
2. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 161 (2004).
3. See Brief for Amici Curiae Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, at 10, Office of
Indep. Counsel v. Favish, 217 F. 3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 02-954).
4. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
5. Favish, 541 U.S. at 157.
6. Id.; see also 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C).
7. Favish, 541 U.S. at 166.
8. Id. The change in the named government party, from the Office of the Independent
Counsel (OIC) to National Archives and Records Administration, was made because the OIC
terminated its operations on March 23, 2004, and transferred all its records - including the Foster
photos - to the National Archives and Records Administration. Id. at 164. Therefore, the National
Archives and Records Administration was substituted as the named petitioner in this case although
the text of the opinion continues to refer to the OIC as "the Petitioner." Id. The Foster photos were
also the subject ofa FOIA lawsuit in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia. Accuracy
in Media, Inc. v. Nat'l Park Serv., 194 F.3d 120, 121 (D.C. Cir. 1999). An organization named
Accuracy in Media (AIM) unsuccessfully sued to get copies of the Foster photographs around the
same time that Favish brought suit in U.S. District Court in California. See id. at 120.
9. Favish, 541 U.S. at 165.
WASH. POST.,
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Supreme Court settled the matter in favor of the government.1 ° In National
Archives andRecords Administration v. Favish, the Court held that FOIA

privacy protection extended to members of Foster's family,"' and that the
family's privacy interests outweighed the public interest in disclosure.1 2 In
so ruling, the Court settled the question of family-privacy riglh~ under the
FOIA - an issue that lower courts have grappled with for more than a
quarter-century.

4

However, the Supreme Court did more than resolve the FOIA-related
family-privacy question. Of far greater significance, theFavish Court
created a new and unprecedented test to help guide the judiciary in
what conditions an invasion of privacy would be
determining under
"unwarranted."1 5 This test requires a FOIA requester to establish "a

10. Id.
11. Id. at 170-71.
12. Id. at 174-75.
13. Although the term "family-privacy rights" is used throughout this Article, courts have
also referred to this form of privacy as "relational privacy" or "survivor privacy." See, e.g.,
Lamonaco v. CBS, No. 93-1975 (ORD) (D.N.J. July 29, 1993).
14. Hale v. Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 894, 902 (10th Cir. 1992) (perceiving no "public
interest in photographs of the deceased victim, let alone one that would outweigh the personal
privacy interests of the victim's family" under exemption 7(C)), cert.granted,vacated& remanded
on other grounds, 509 U.S. 918 (1993); Badhwar v. Dep't of the Air Force, 829 F.2d 182, 185-86
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (noting that some parts of an autopsy report might "shock the sensibilities of
surviving kin" and therefore be exempt under exemption 6 ofthe FOIA); Marzen v. HHS, 825 F.2d
1148, 1154 (7th Cir. 1987) (holding that under exemption 7(C), a deceased infant's medical records
are exempt because their release "would almost certainly cause [the infant's] parents more
anguish"); Kiraly v. FBI, 728 F.2d 273, 278 (6th Cir. 1984) (recognizing that the privacy interest
in exception 7(C) "must be deemed generally to include information about an individual which he
could reasonably assert an option to withhold from the public at large because of its intimacy or its
possible adverse effects upon himself or hisfamily"); Lesar v. Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 486,
488 (D.C. Cir. 1980) (affirming a D.C. district court decision under exemption 7(C) and allowing
the FBI to withhold information about its surveillance of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr. out of respect
for the privacy rights of his surviving family members); Coleman v. FBI, 13 F. Supp. 2d 75, 80
(D.D.C. 1998) (citing privacy interests of murder victim's family under exemption 7(C) to allow
withholding of the victim's photographs and records); Katz v. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin.,
862 F. Supp. 476, 485-86 (D.D.C. 1994) (finding that x-rays and photographs from President
Kennedy's autopsy were exempt under exemption 6 because public display of the records would
cause extreme anguish to the Kennedy family), aff'd,68 F.3d 1438 (D.C. Cir. 1995); Epps v. Dep't
of Justice, 801 F. Supp. 787, 793 (D.D.C. 1992) (stating that "an individual's interest in not having
his or her autopsy photographs released.., is substantial," as is interest of family, under exemption
7(C)), affd without opinion, 995 F.2d 305 (D.C. Cir. 1993); N.Y. Times v. NASA, 782 F. Supp.
628, 633 (D.D.C. 1991) (permitting NASA to withhold tape recording of voices of astronauts
aboard final flight of Challenger space shuttle under exemption 6), on remand, N.Y. Times v.
NASA, 920 F.2d 1002, 1010 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (en banc).
15. Favish, 541 U.S. at 172.
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sufficient reason" for disclosure by showing that there is a significant
public interest in the requested information, and that disclosure of the6
materials is likely to advance that significant public interest.
Furthermore, the Court requires that when the asserted public interest is to
investigate government wrongdoing, the requester must produce evidence
of malfeasance in advance of the disclosure in order to overcome a
"presumption of legitimacy" accorded to official government conduct and
records. 17 In creating the "sufficient reason" test and establishing the
"presumption of legitimacy" doctrine in FOIA jurisprudence, the Favish
Court handed down its most significant FOIA ruling since 1989 when the
Court defined the "central purpose" of the statute.1 8
The factual issues raised in Favish were thorny. It is hard not to feel
compassion for Foster's widow and other family members. They suffered
a terrible and very public personal tragedy, and then found themselves
thrust into the media's spotlight. If the gruesome pictures had been
released to a "sensation-seeking culture," 19 as described by Justice
Kennedy in the Favish opinion, the photos almost certainly would have
ended up on the Internet and exploited by the media. On the other hand,
the public's interest in the Foster case was unusually high; it focused on
the unnatural and unusual death of a government official possessing
information about other high-level officials, including the President, all of
whom were embroiled in a public controversy. 20 However, according to
news media organizations that filed an amicus brief in Favish, supporting
privacy under these circumstances would establish a precedent that would
potentially allow the government to cloak federal law enforcement
activities in secrecy under the guise of protecting personal privacy.21
16. Id.
17. Id. at 174.
18. See Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 774
(1989). In the Reporters Committee decision, the Court substantially narrowed the scope of records
available under the FOIA by holding that the statute applies only to information that directly sheds
light on the government's performance of its duties. Id. at 774-75. The Reporters Committee
decision will be discussed in detail later in this Article.
19. Favish, 541 U.S. at 166.
20. See Brief for Amici Curiae Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press at 4, 8, Office
of Indep. Counsel v. Favish, 217 F. 3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 02-954).
21. See id.at 14-15. News media organizations thatjoined in an amici curiae brief in support
of disclosure of the Foster photos included Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
American Society of Newspaper Editors, Radio-Television News Directors Association, Society
of Professional Journalists, Association of Alternative Newsweeklies, National Press Club,
Investigative Reporters and Editors, Inc., and National Freedom of Information Coalition. These
groups joined as friends of the court because journalists' access to government information would
be affected by the case's outcome.
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365

The purpose of this Article is to examine the Court's decision to extend
privacy protection to the family members of a deceased person who is the
subject of a FOIA record request. 22 In particular, this Article seeks to shed
light on the derivation of the Favish Court's rationale behind its "sufficient
reason" test and the "presumption of legitimacy" doctrine. The next
section of this Article reviews the plain language and legislative histories
of the FOIA and its two exceptions for personal privacy, exemptions 6 and
7(C). 23 The third section examines the decade-long Favish proceedings,
from the lower courts through the Supreme Court decision. This section
also traces the long line of family-privacy cases that preceded Favish.24
Section four analyzes the "sufficient reason" test and "presumption of
legitimacy" doctrine, and discusses their far-reaching implications in
future FOIA conflicts between the legitimate values of government
transparency and personal privacy protection. This Article concludes that
the Court's recognition of privacy rights for family members of the dead
reflects reasonable FOIA public policy, particularly in light of the vast
scope and virtual perpetuity of an unwarranted invasion of privacy in the
Internet age. However, this Article also finds that certain elements of the
Favish Court's standard for determining an "unwarranted" invasion of
privacy erect a hurdle so high as to create a presumption of nondisclosure
that plainly contravenes FOIA's statutory language and congressional
intent.

22. Although family-privacy rights (relational privacy and survivor privacy) under tort law
and under some state open-records laws has been covered in legal journals, the subject of family
privacy protection under the federal FOIA has been largely overlooked. See, e.g., Samuel A. Terilli
& Sigman L. Splichal, Public Access to Autopsy and Death-Scene Photographs:Relational
Privacy,PublicRecords andA voidable Collisions, 10 CoMM. L. & POL'Y 313 (2005); Jessica Berg,
Grave Secrets: Legal and Ethical Analysis of Postmortem Confidentiality,34 CONN. L. REV. 81
(2001); Matthew Bunker & Sigman L. Splichal, Relational Privacy Cases and Freedom of
Information, 18 NEWSPAPER RES. J. 109 (1997); John A. Jurata, The Tort That Refuses to Go Away:
The Subtle Reemergence ofPublic Disclosureof PrivateFacts, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 489 (1999);
Daniel J. Solove, ConceptualizingPrivacy, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1087 (2002); Patrick Bailey, Note, In
the Wake ofa Tragedy: The EarnhardtFamilyProtectionAct BringsFlorida'sPublicRecords Law
Under the Hot Lights, 26 NOVA L. REV. 305 (2001); Patrick M. McCarthy, Note, Michigan's
Freedom of Information Act and PersonalPrivacy:A Divergencefrom the FederalFreedom of
Information Act as to Privacy Interests of Deceased Persons and Their Families, 69 U. DET.
MERCY L. REV. 599 (1992).
23. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)6 & (b)7(C) (2000).
24. See supra text accompanying note 14.
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II. THE FOIA AND PRIVACY
Congress passed the FOIA in 1966 and has amended it in significant
respects several times over the years. 25 The FOIA allows public inspection
of records held by the dozens of federal agencies, such as the Health and
Human Services Administration, the Federal Trade Commission, and the
Federal Emergency Management Agency.26 The statute also applies to the
records held by federal cabinet departments, including the Departments of
State, Defense and Commerce, and includes subdepartments such as the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Census Bureau. The FOIA
does not apply to records held by Congress, state or local governments,
courts, private individuals or private companies, including private entities
under federal contracts.2 7 In addition to requiring that federal agencies and
departments comply with FOIA requests for records in their possession,
the statute mandates an affirmative duty of disclosure, meaning that the
government must automatically make public certain kinds of information.28 For example, the statute requires federal agencies to make their
organizational plans and regulations available in public reading rooms.29
Agencies also must publish this information in the Federal Register and on
the Internet.3"
The FOIA makes records available to "any person" upon request,31 and
a FOIA requester is not required to explain why a record should be
disclosed or for what purpose a record is being requested.32 The
Department of Justice Office of Information and Privacy, which oversees
compliance with the FOIA, states: "Inasmuch as FOIA requests can be
made for any reason whatsoever, FOIA requesters generally do not have
to justify or explain their reasons for making a request."33 The statute

25. The FOIA was amended in 1974, 1976, 1986, and 1996. Pub. L. No. 93-502, 88 Stat.
1561 (1974); Pub. L. No. 94-409,90 Stat. 1241 (1976); Pub. L. No. 99-570, 100 Stat. 3207 (1986);
Pub. L. No. 104-231, 110 Stat 3048 (1996).

26. OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND PRIVACY, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, FREEDOM OF
INFORMATION ACT GUIDE & PRIVACY ACT OVERVIEW 31-36, MAY2004 [hereinafter FOIA GUIDE]
(The FOIA Guide is the Department of Justice's official 1100-page guide explaining the provisions
of the FOIA and Privacy Act and summarizing the case law pertaining to these two statutes).
27. Id.
28. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(2) (2000).
29. Id.
30. Id. Congress created the Internet publication requirement in the 1996 amendments to the
FOIA. Electronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996 (EFOIA), Pub. L. 104-231, §§ 1-12 (1996)
(amending sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000)).
31. FOIA GUIDE, supra note 26, at 44.
32. Id. at 46.
33. Id.
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places the burden on the government to sustain its decisions to refuse
disclosure.34
A. A Broad Philosophy of Accountability and Transparency
Before the FOIA was enacted, no judicially enforceable remedy existed
for the press or general public when they were denied access to
government information.3 ' The FOIA replaced Section 3 of the
Administrative Procedure Act (APA) of 1946,36 which ostensibly served
as a public information provision to permit the public to gain access to
federal records. 37 However, the law was filled with loopholes that the
government routinely exploited to withhold records. 38 The main obstacle
to public access under the APA was a requirement that record requesters
demonstrate that the solicited information pertain directly to them.39 This
restriction prevented journalists, writers, historians, lawyers, and others
from gaining access to information held by the federal government.
4
The FOIA embodies a strong presumption "of full agency disclosure"
based on the principle that the "public as a whole has a right to know what
its Government is doing. ' '4' The FOIA's legislative history shows that
Congress was guided by a philosophy that directly linked a policy of full
agency disclosure to bedrock democratic principles. 42 A 1965 Senate
report, widely considered by Congress and the Supreme Court as the

34. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(B) ("the burden is on the agency to sustain its action" in rejecting
a FOIA request for disclosure); see also Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. EPA, 856 F.2d 309, 311
(D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting the agency withholding requested information bears the burden of
justifying its decision).
35. H. REP. No. 89-1497, at 5 (1966), as reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2418; see
generally HAROLD L. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW: LEGAL ACCESS TO PUBLIC RECORDS
AND PROCEEDINGS (1953); JAMES RUSSELL WIGGINS, FREEDOM OR SECRECY (1964).

36. 5 U.S.C. § 1002 (1946).
37. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965).
38. A 1965 Senate report on the proposed FOIA legislation described the APA as "full of
loopholes which allow agencies to deny legitimate information to the public. Innumerable times
it appears that information is withheld only to cover up embarrassing mistakes or irregularities ......
S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965); see also CROSS supra note 35, at 223-28 (1953). Cross was a
Columbia University law professor, an attorney for the New York HeraldTribune and a leader in
the political movement to enact the FOIA. He wrote that the governmental "cult of secrecy" that
developed after the Second World War rested in great part on the "tortured interpretation" of APA
section 3. Id. at 246.
39. See S. REP. No. 89-813, at 5 (1965).
40. Id. at 3.
41. Id. at 5.
42. See, e.g., id.; H.R. REP. No. 89-1497 (1966), as reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418,
2418-19 (stating the purpose behind the bill that became the FOIA).
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leading indicator of the FOIA's legislative intent,43 instructs that: "A
government by secrecy benefits no one. It injures the people it seeks to
serve; it injures its own integrity and operation. It breeds mistrust,
dampens the fervor of its citizens, and mocks their loyalty." 4'
In the years since the statute was signed into law by President Lyndon
B. Johnson on July 4, 1966, 45 Congress has repeatedly reiterated this
presumption of government openness, 46 and the Supreme Court has

43. In a series of majority opinions, the U.S. Supreme Court has cited this 1965 Senate report
as the primary indicator of the FOIA's legislative purpose. Justice Byron White wrote: "Without
question, the Act is broadly conceived. It seeks to permit access to official information long
shielded unnecessarily from public view and attempts to create ajudicially enforceable public right
to secure such information from possibly unwilling official hands." EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80
(1973) (citing S. REP. No. 89-813, at 2 (1965)). Justice Brennan wrote that the FOIA's "basic
purpose reflect[s] 'ageneral philosophy of full agency disclosure' unless information falls under
one of the nine exemptions. Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 360-61 (1976) (quoting S.
REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965)). He stressed, however, that these exemptions are limited, and "do not
obscure the basic policy that disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the act." Id. at
361.
44. S.REP. No. 89-813, at 10 (1965).
45. See Admin Proc. Act of 1966, Pub. L. 89-487, 80 Stat. 250 (1966).
46. Congress emphasized FOIA's presumption ofopenness in 1974 in the first round ofFOIA
amendments when lawmakers overrode EPA v. Mink. Congress said the Mink opinion conflicted
with the FOIA's broad philosophy of disclosure because the Court forbade de novo inspection as
a check against government assertions that purportedly classified information was indeed properly
classified according to Executive Order guidelines. S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 9 (1974), as reprinted
in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6285, 6287, 6290. Congress further reinforced FOIA's disclosure-friendly
intent by also requiring that agencies segregate and release unclassified information contained in
a document that may also contain classified information. See S. REP. No. 93-1200, at 12. In 1976,
Congress again amended the FOIA in order to nullify FAA v. Robertson, in which the Supreme
Court broadly interpreted an agency's discretion to refuse disclosure. See FAA v. Robertson, 422
U.S. 255, 266-67 (1975); see also H.R. REP. No. 94-880(I), at 23 (1976), as reprintedin 1976
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2183, 2205 (stating that Robertson illustrated a "misconception of the intent of
exemption (3)" and recommending amendment). Congress said that the Robertson opinion
contravened the FOIA's plain meaning and congressional intent. In amending the FOIA, lawmakers
reiterated the statute's strong presumption of openness and explicitly limited agency discretion to
withhold information. Id.In 1996, the most recent amendment to the FOIA, lawmakers nullified
a Ninth Circuit opinion that upheld the government's right to withhold computerized database
information on the ground that electronically recorded and stored information does not qualify as
"agency record" under the FOIA. See SDC Dev. Corp. v. Mathews, 542 F.2d 1116, 1121 (9th Cir.
1976). See H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 20 (1996), as reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3463.
The House report accompanying the 1996 amendments, known as the EFOIA, explicitly rejected
the Ninth Circuit's decision and made clear that government-held information in any form,
including electronic or computerized formats, is subject to the FOIA's disclosure requirements.
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consistently recognized this principle.47 In Departmentof the Air Force v.
Rose, the first FOIA privacy case to reach the Court, Justice Brennan,
writing for the majority, declared that Congress enacted the FOIA to
"pierce the veil" of government secrecy so that the public can evaluate the
48
government's performance and promote governmental accountability.
The FOIA has been used by journalists, writers, and others to reveal
waste, fraud, and wrongdoing in the federal government, and to identify a
wide variety of unsafe consumer products, harmful drugs, and serious
health hazards.4 9 In recent years, for example, the PhiladelphiaInquirer

used the FOIA to learn that federal citations for pollution-law violations
plummeted thirty-five percent during the early years of George W. Bush's
administration,5 ° and the Dayton Daily News obtained documents that
disclosed that the government ignored sexual assault charges brought by
women in the military against enlisted men and officers. 1
Although the FOIA carries a clear presumption of openness, the
public's
interest in government-held information is not allencompassing. 2 While Congress recognized that citizens in a participatory
democracy must have access to government information in order to make

47. See, e.g., Dep't of Def. v. FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 493-94 (1994); Dep't of Justice v.
Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 755 (1989); NLRB v. Robbins Tire &
Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 220 (1978); Rose, 425 U.S. at 360-61; Mink, 410 U.S. at 80.
48. Rose, 425 U.S. at 361 (quoting Rose v. Dep't of the Air Force, 495 F.2d. 261, 263
(1974)).
49. H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 7 (1996), as reprintedin 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3448, 3450
("FOIA access to unpublished agency records has resulted in many disclosures of waste and fraud
in the Federal Government.... Exposures resulting from FOIA disclosures, and the reactions they
produce, are critical to maintaining an open and free society"). Investigations by journalists using
the FOIA have exposed FBI harassment of Dr. Martin Luther King, Jr., safety hazards at nuclear
power plants, unsanitary conditions at food processing plants, the presence of harmful wastes in
drinking water, and the increased incidence of cancer among Plutonium workers. KENT R.
MIDDLETON ET AL., THE LAW OF PUBLIC COMMUNICATION 482 (2003).
50. Seth Borenstein, Pollution CitationsPlummet Under Bush, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 9,
2003, at A-1.
51.

REPORTERS COMMITTEE FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, HOW TO USE THE FEDERAL FOI

ACT 2 (9th ed. 2004). Russell Carollo, Military Secrets, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 1, 1995, at A. The Dayton Daily News also used documents acquired under the FOIA to report on the risks,
violence, accidents, disease, and suicide faced abroad by Peace Corps volunteers, especially
women. Id. Russell Carollo, Casualtiesof Peace, DAYTON DAILY NEWS, Oct. 26, 2003, at A- 1.
52. See Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 774-75.
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informed and meaningful decisions,53 lawmakers also acknowledged that
confidentiality is sometimes necessary for the effective functioning of
government and the protection of individuals and businesses.54 The
FOIA' s crafters therefore created nine statutory exemptions that enumerate
specific categories of information that agencies may withhold from
requesters.55 If requested information falls under any of these categories,
agencies are permitted - but not required - to refuse disclosure.56
However, both Congress57 and the Supreme Court58 have emphasized that
these exemptions are limited in scope and are to be narrowly interpreted.
Referring to privacy concerns in particular, the Senate report that
accompanied the original FOIA legislation declared "[s]uccess lies in
providing a workable formula which encompasses, balances, and protects
all interests, yet places emphasis on the fullest responsible disclosure."'5 9
As the Supreme Court noted in its first privacy-exemption decision in
60
1976, "disclosure, not secrecy, is the dominant objective of the Act."

53. See H. REP. No. 89-1497,2-3 & 5-6 (1966), as reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418; see
also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978) (observing that the FOIA
"ensure[s] an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning of a democratic society"); Reporters
Comm., 489 U.S. at 772-73 (noting that a "democracy cannot function" unless the public has a right
of access to government information).
54. S.REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965) ("At the same time that abroad philosophy of 'freedom
is enacted into law, it is necessary to protect certain equally important rights of
information'
of
privacy... certain material, such as the investigatory files of the Federal Bureau of Investigation").
55. See 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(1)-(9). Federal agencies may-but are not required to-withhold
a document, record, or file if it falls under one of nine categories of exempted materials: (1)
information that has been classified under executive order in the interests of national defense or
foreign relations; (2) internal agency personnel rules and practices; (3) information exempted by
other statutes; (4) trade secrets and financial data and other confidential business information; (5)
inter-agency and intra-agency memoranda; (6) disclosures that invade personal privacy such as
personnel, medical, and similar files; (7) records or information compiled for law enforcement
purposes; (8) records or files contained in reports from regulated financial institutions; and (9)
geological and geophysical information from oil and gas drillers.
56. See id.
57. Lawmakers stressed that the exemptions were limited, and when it comes to information
that falls outside of these categories, "all citizens have a right to know." S. REP. No. 89-813, at 6
(1965).
58. Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 361 (1976) (quoting Rose v. Dep't of the Air
Force, 495 F.2d. 261, 263 (1974)).
59. S.REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965).
60. Rose, 425 U.S. at 361.
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B. FOIA 's Privacy Exemptions 6 and 7(C)
Of the nine exemptions to disclosure, exemptions 6 and 7(C) focus on
"unwarranted" invasions of privacy and reflect congressional efforts to
balance the individual's interest in privacy against the public's interest in
disclosure.
The language of exemption 6, crafted in the FOIA of 1966, has
remained unchanged over the years. This exemption states that the
government can withhold "personnel and medical files and similar files the
disclosure of which would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy." 61 When an agency makes a determination in a privacyinterests case under exemption 6, it first must decide whether the requested
records fall within the definition of "personnel," "medical," or "similar"
files. 62 Second, the agency must balance the invasion of the individual's
personal privacy against the public's interest in disclosure to determine
whether the disclosure is justified.63
Both the House and Senate reports accompanying the original FOIA
legislation evince a congressional intent that agencies and courts avoid a
blanket exemption for personnel, medical, and other similar files.
Lawmakers clearly compelled a true balancing of the competing interests
in question. 4 The House report states: "The limitation of a 'clearly
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy' provides a proper balance
between the protection of an individual's right of privacy and the
preservation of the public's right to government information by excluding
those kinds of files the disclosure of which might harm the individual." 65
Similarly, the Senate report states: "The phrase 'clearly unwarranted
invasion of personal privacy' enunciates a policy that will involve a
balancing of interests between the protection of an individual's private
affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny, and the preservation of the
public's right to governmental information." 6
Unlike exemption 6, exemption 7(C) was not included in the original
FOIA statute but was added in the 1974 amendments. Exemption 7
provides protection for investigatory "records or information compiled for
law enforcement purposes. ",67 The exemption 7(C) subcategory

61. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1964).
62. See id.
63. See H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 4 (1966), as reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.A.N. 2418, 2423.
64. See id. at 11; see also S. REP. No. 89-813, at 9 (1965).
65. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 11 (1966), as reprintedin 1966 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2418, 2428.
66. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 9 (1965).
67. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)7(C) (2000). Exemption 7 contains six subcategories, applying to
information that: a) would interfere with enforcement proceedings; b) would deprive a defendant
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specifically protects from disclosure any law enforcement information,
which if released, "could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 68 The impetus behind the
exemption 7(C) subcategory was to prevent disclosures that could
potentially endanger law enforcement personnel, their families, and
confidential informants who cooperate with authorities.69 In resolving an
exemption 7(C) dispute, the courts use a two-prong approach to decide
whether a record can be disclosed.7" First, the documents must have been
compiled for law enforcement purposes. Second, the government must
prove that the disclosure "could reasonably be expected to constitute an
unwarranted invasion of privacy." 71 The Supreme Court has held that
when exemption 7(C) is triggered, a balancing test similar to that used in
an exemption 6 dispute should be employed to weigh the public interest in
disclosure against the individual's interests in privacy.72
The essential differences between exemptions 6 and 7(C) are evident
in their statutory language. Exemption 6 requires the government to show
that disclosure "would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of
privacy." 73 By comparison, exemption 7(C) requires a less strict standard,
compelling an agency to show only that disclosure "could reasonably be
expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy." 7' By
a fair trial; c) could constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy; d) could identify a
confidential source; e) would disclose law enforcement techniques or procedures; and f) could
endanger an individual's life or safety. Id. §§ 552(b)7(A)-(7)(E).
68. Id. § 552(b)7(C).
69. See 120 CONG. REc. S9336-37 (1974) (statement by Sen. Philip Hart); see also James T.
O'Reilly, 2 Federal Information Disclosure 101 (3d ed. 2000). In the Attorney General's
Memorandum on the 1974 amendments, Attorney General Edward H. Levi wrote that the FOIA's
privacy interest "must be deemed generally to include information about an individual which he
could reasonably assert an option to withhold from the public at large because of its intimacy or its
possible adverse affects upon himself or his family." A.G.'s 1974 FOI Amdts. Mem. (Feb. 1975),
reprintedin Freedom of Information Act and Amendments of 1974 (P.L. 93-502), Joint Comm. of
the Comm. of Government Operations ofthe U.S. House of Representatives, and the Comm. on the
Judiciary of the U.S. Senate, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., Mar. 1975, at 519-20 [hereinafter 1974 FOIA
SOURCE BOOK].

70. See Federal Bureau of Investigation v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615,622 (1982) (calling this
analysis a "two-part inquiry"). The U.S. Supreme Court has held that "information initially
contained in a record made for law enforcement purposes continues to meet that threshold
requirements of Exemption 7 where that recorded information is reproduced or summarized in a
new document prepared for a non-law-enforcement purpose." Id. at 632.
71. Id.
72. See Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 776-77
(1989).
73. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)6 (emphasis added).
74. Id. § 552(b)7(C) (emphasis added).
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using "would" rather than "could," and also dropping the term "clearly"in
exemption 7(C), lawmakers reduced an agency's burden to meet
exemption 7(C)'s withholding standard. This difference in language was
intended; the legislative history shows that when exemption 7(C) was
originally proposed, it also required a "clearly" unwarranted invasion of
personal privacy. 75 However, the conference committee handling the
proposed amendments dropped the word "clearly" as a concession to get
President Gerald Ford to approve the legislation.76 Accordingly, courts
have reasoned that under exemption 7(C), agencies have greater discretion
to withhold records on grounds of protecting privacy than would be
allowed under the more stringent (i.e., disclosure-friendly) exemption 6
standard. 77 It is significant to note that the language of both privacy
exemptions 6 and 7(C) is worded broadly. Key terms such as "clearly
unwarranted 78 or "unnecessary public scrutiny"79 are not defined in the
statute's plain text or legislative histories. The absence of such clarifying
language became a significant factor in the Supreme Court's rationale in
NationalArchives and Records Administration v. Favish.8 °
III. SEEKING THE FOSTER SUICIDE PHOTOS

Vincent Foster was found dead in Fort Marcy Park in Virginia, just
outside Washington, D.C., on July 20, 1993.81 The U.S. Park Police
conducted the initial investigation, and officers took color photos of the
death scene, including ten pictures of Foster's body.
82 Park Police
investigators concluded that Foster took his own life by shooting himself
in the mouth with a .38-caliber revolver.8 3 His body was found with the
gun in his hand and his thumb on the trigger. 84 There were no signs of a
struggle or trauma (other than his head wound) and nothing indicated that

75. See 120 CONG. REc. 17033 (1974) (daily ed. May 30, 1974) (statement of Sen. Hart).
76. JAMES T. O'REILLY, FEDERAL INFORMATION DiscLosURE 101 (3d ed. 2000).

77. See, e.g., Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 755-56.
78. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)6.
79. SEN. REP. No. 93-813, at 9 (1965).
80. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 160-61 (2004).
81. Ruth Marcus, Clinton Aide Vincent FosterDies in Apparent Suicide, WASH. POST, July
21, 1993, at A-1.
82. SeeFavish, 541 U.S. at 160-61.
83. See id.; see also Stephen Labaton, JusticeDept. to Stay on Case ofAide's Death, N.Y.
TIMES, July 23, 1993, at A-10.
84. Favish v. Office of the Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1179 (9th Cir. 2000) (Pregerson,
J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
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the foliage and area around his body had been trampled by others.85
Afterward, a tom-up handwritten suicide note was found in Foster's
briefcase at his White House office.86 Subsequent independent
investigations by the FBI, committees of the Senate and the House of
Representatives, and two separate Offices of the Independent Counsel
(OIC) all concluded that Foster committed suicide.87
However, a Los Angeles attorney named Allan J. Favish remained
skeptical. He contended that the government investigations were "grossly
incomplete and untrustworthy." 88 Favish, acting as a citizen on his own
behalf, used the FOIA to request 150 photos taken by investigators,
including the 10 photos depicting Foster's body. 89 The OIC, which held
possession of the pictures, invoked exemption 7(C) and refused to release
them. 90
A. How the Lower Courts Ruled
Favish sued in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of
California on March 6, 1997, to obtain the photos. 91 On April 28, 1997, the
government released 118 copies of the photos in black and white.92 Favish
withdrew his request for 21 photos, leaving only 11 pictures in dispute,
along with Favish's request for color copies of the released photos.93
After the district court reviewed government affidavits describing the
graphic nature of the photos, it ordered the release of a photo of Foster's
eyeglasses, but upheld the OIC's exemption 7(C) claim to withhold the
remaining ten photos depicting Foster's body.94 The district court upheld

85. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
86. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part).
87. Id. at 1179 (Pregerson, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). The first OIC
investigation was carried out by Independent Counsel Robert B. Fiske, Jr. and reported on June 30,
1994. Id. (Pregerson, J., dissenting in part, concurring in part). A second OIC probe was authorized
by Fiske's successor, Kenneth W. Starr, in connection with the Whitewater investigation into the
financial affairs of President Bill Clinton and his wife, Hillary Clinton. Id. at 1179-80 (Pregerson,
J., dissenting in part, concurring in part); see Report on the Death of Vincent W. FosterJr., By the
Office of Independent Counsel, In re: Madison Guaranty Savings & Loan Ass 'n, to the Special
Division of the United States Court ofAppeals for the District of Columbia Circuit(filed July 15,
1997).
88. Nat'l Archives & Record Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 161 (2004).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Favish, 217 F.3d at 1168, 1169.
.92. Id. at 1170.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 1171.
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the government's contention that under exemption 7(C), Foster's surviving
family members enjoy a right of personal privacy, which could be
infringed by disclosure of the photographs.95 In addressing the public
interest in disclosure of the photos, the district court found that "Favish
had not sufficiently explained how disclosure of [the] photographs [would]
advance his investigation into Foster's death." 96 Further, the district court
found that any asserted public interest in disclosure was diminished by the
exhaustive government investigations that already occurred. 9' In
balancing the public interest in disclosure against the Foster family's
interest in privacy, the district court concluded that the privacy interests
outweighed the public interest in disclosure and held that the OIC could
refuse to release the pictures.98
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that
the statutory language of exemption 7(C) was broad, pointing out that the
FOIA "does not identify whose personal privacy may not be unjustifiably
invaded." 99 Reasoning that the statute "leaves open the possibility that the
exemption does extend to other than the person to whom the information
relates, '"

the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court ruling that

exemption 7(C) may apply to protect the "memory of the deceased held by
those tied closely to the deceased by blood or love." 101
However, the Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court on other
matters. The appellate court held that Favish did not have a duty to explain
his reason for requesting the photos, nor did he have to show how access
to the photos would advance his investigation into Foster's death.'0 2 The
Ninth Circuit acknowledged that evidence or knowledge of wrongdoing by
the investigative agency may "enhanc[e] the urgency of the FOIA request,"
but added that there is nothing in the statute that compels "the requesting
10 3
party [to show] that he has knowledge of malfeasance by the agency."
The appeals court held that Favish's FOIA request was in "complete
conformity with the statutory purpose that the public know what its
government is up to," "4 and that it was not pertinent that five separate

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.

Id.
Nat'l Archives & Record Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 162 (2004).
Id.
Id.
Favish, 217 F.3d at 1173.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1172-73.
Id.
Favish, 217 F.3d at 1172-73.
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investigations into Foster's death reached the same conclusions. 5 The
look, a right to speculate
Ninth Circuit concluded that there is "a right to 106
and argue again, a right of public scrutiny ....
Further, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in that it
balanced the opposing interests of personal privacy and public disclosure
based only on the government's affidavits describing the photos.'0 7 The
Ninth Circuit recognized that the district court has discretion to rule on a
FOIA case on the basis of affidavits, but the appeals court held that the
government affidavits in Favish were "insufficiently detailed."10 8 The
appeals court thus remanded the case so the district court could examine
the photos in camera and, consistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion,
"balance the effect of their release on the privacy of the Foster family
against the public benefit to be obtained by their release." 1" After reviewing the photos, the district court ordered the release of five of the contested
ten photographs. 1 0 On a second appeal, the Ninth Circuit, without
explanation in an unpublished opinion, upheld the release of four of the
pictures."' Both the government and Favish appealed the Ninth Circuit
decision to the Supreme Court.
B. The Supreme Court's Rationale
Justice Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court in NationalArchives
and Records Administration v. Favish,1 2 noted at the outset that both
parties agreed that the disputed photos in the OIC's possession were
"records or information compiled for law enforcement purposes," and the
request for the photos therefore triggered privacy exemption 7(C). 3 The
issue before the Court, therefore, was whether disclosure of the four photos
showing the condition of Foster's body at the death scene "could
reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal
privacy.,'114 In order to make this determination, Kennedy said the Court
must consider two issues. The initial question concerned whether the

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.

Id. at 1173.
Id.
Id. at 1174.
Id.
Favish, 217 F.3d at 1174.
Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 163 (2004).
Id. at 164.
Id. at 157.
Id. at 164.
Id.
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privacy interests protected by exemption 7(C) extended to Foster's
family." 5 Next, if the family did have a cognizable personal privacy
interest under the FOIA, then the Court must determine whether that
privacy interest outweighed the public interest in disclosure." 6
1. Cognizable Family-Privacy Rights
The Court first analyzed Favish's argument that Foster's family has no
personal privacy interests covered by exemption 7(C). Favish contended
that the requested photos pertained only to Foster, not to his family, and
that the FOIA's right to personal privacy means only "the right to control
information about oneself."' 17 Favish quoted language from a landmark
FOIA Supreme Court opinion, Department of Justice v. Reporters
Committeefor Freedom of the Press,in which the Court observed that "the
common law and the literal understandings of privacy encompass the
individual's control of information concerning his or her person.""
Favish argued that only the individual who is the subject of the requested
information is protected by exemption 7(C), and that this protection lapses
upon death." 9
The Court rejected Favish's interpretation of the Reporters Committee
Court's language as "too narrow."' 2° Justice Kennedy wrote "[t]o say that
the concept of personal privacy must 'encompass' the individual's control
of information about himself does not mean it cannot encompass other
personal privacy interests as well."'' He pointed out that the 1989
Reporters Committee opinion clarified that the "concept of personal
privacy under exemption 7(C) is not some limited or 'cramped notion' of
that idea."' 22 Justice Kennedy wrote that the "comparative breadth" of
exemption 7(C)'s statutory language implies broader applicability than
Favish described. Furthermore, he emphasized that the personal privacy
interest being asserted was not that of Foster's but that of his survivors: 23

115. Favish, 541 U.S. at 160.
116. Id.
117. Id.at 165.
118. Id. (citing Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
763 (1989)).
119. See id.
120. Favish, 541 U.S. at 165.
121. Id.
122. Id. (citing Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 763).
123. Id. at 166.
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The family does not invoke exemption 7(C) on behalf of Vincent
Foster ... for fear that the pictures may reveal private information
about Foster to the detriment of his own posthumous reputation or
some other interest personal to him .... They seek to be shielded
by the exemption to secure their own refuge from a sensationseeking culture for their own peace of mind and tranquility." 4
The Court appeared to be swayed by the sworn affidavit of Shiela
Foster Anthony, which the opinion quoted at length. Anthony recounted
how "the family had been harassed by, and deluged with, requests from,
'[p]olitical and commercial opportunists' who sought to profit from
Foster's suicide." '25 In particular, Anthony noted how she was "horrified
and devastated" by a photo leaked to Time Magazine and ABC News,
showing the gun in Foster's hand.126 "Every time I see it," Anthony wrote,
"I have nightmares and heart pounding insomnia as I visualize how he
must have spent his last few minutes and seconds of his life."' 27
The Court reasoned that extending exemption 7(C) privacy rights to
family members had support in time-honored cultural traditions, including
the right of family members to direct the disposition of a relative's body
and to limit attempts to exploit pictures of the deceased's remains for
public purposes. 12 8 Moreover, Justice Kennedy noted that family-privacy
rights have been recognized in state common law since 1895,129 and it
124. Id.
125. Favish, 541 U.S. at 166.
126. Id. A copy of a Foster death photo was published by Time Magazine on March 18, 1996
and broadcast on ABC news. Favish v. Office of the Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1170 (9th Cir.
2000).
127. Favish, 541 U.S. at 167.
128. "Family members have a personal stake in honoring and mourning their dead and
objecting to unwarranted public exploitation that, by intruding upon their own grief, tends to
degrade the rites and respect they accord to the deceased." Id. at 168.
129. Id. at 168-69 (citing Schuyler v. Curtis, 42 N.E. 22, 25 (N.Y. 1895) ("A [privacy]
privilege may be given the surviving relatives of a deceased person to protect his memory, but the
privilege exists for the benefit of the living, to protect their feelings, and to prevent a violation of
their own rights .... )); see also Reid v. Pierce County, 961 P. 2d 333, 342 (Wash. 1998) ("[T]he
immediate relatives of a decedent have a protectable privacy interest in the autopsy records of the
decedent"); McCambridge v. Little Rock, 766 S.W.2d 909, 915 (Ark. 1989) (recognizing the
privacy interest of the murder victim's mother in crime scene photographs); Bazemore v. Savannah
Hosp., 155 S.E. 194 (Ga. 1930) (per curiam) (recognizing parents' right of privacy in photographs
of their deceased child's body); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, 387 (1977)
(recognizing that publication of a photograph of a deceased infant - a hypothetical "child with two
heads" - over the objection of the mother would result in an invasion of the mother's privacy).
A common law right to privacy was first recognized in 1890 when a New York court responded
to Samuel D. Warren's and Louis D. Brandeis's seminal HarvardLaw Review article, which called
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would be "anomalous" to hold that the FOIA "provides even less
protection than does the common law. 13°
Finally, the Court emphasized that recognizing family-privacy rights
under the FOIA would be consistent with the holdings of several lower
federal courts that had considered the question.1 3' A review of cases
focusing on family-privacy rights under the FOIA reveals a long line of
federal court opinions that have consistently recognized this form of

protection under privacy exemptions 6 and 7(C).132 The materials withheld
under exemptions 6 and 7(C) vary widely and include autopsy and death
135
military accident
scene photos, 13 3 FBI records, 34 medical records,
137
36
reports,1 and audio recordings. Equally varied are the FOIA requesters
who sought this information; they include journalists, 138 convicted
felons, 139 a public-interest group, 4 ° and an immigration lawyer. 41
Case law recognizing family-privacy rights under the FOIA can be
traced to a 1978 exemption 7(C) case pertaining to FBI records on Dr.
Martin Luther King, Jr. 142 In Lesar v. Department of Justice, the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia held that the government could
withhold certain information contained in FBI files regarding the FBI's
surveillance of King to protect the personal privacy of the slain civil rights
leader's family members. 4 3 The D.C. Circuit affirmed, reasoning that the
withheld material consisted primarily of identifying information about
persons involved in the King investigation, including informants "as well
as information of a personal nature, the disclosure of which could

for privacy protection and a "right to be let alone." W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSERAND KEETON
ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, 849-50 (5th ed. 1984) (citing Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis,
The Right to Privacy,4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890)). That first decision, Manola v. Stevens, N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1890, concerned a lawsuit brought by an actress against a man who had photographed her

while she was on stage, clad in tights - scandalous attire for those times. A New York judge
enjoined the photographer from publishing the photo. See id. at 850 n. 10.
130. Favish, 541 U.S. at 170.
131. Id.
132. See supra text accompanying note 14.
133. See Hale v. Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 894, 901-02 (10th Cir. 1992).
134. See Lesar v. Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 486 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
135. See Marzen v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 825 F.2d 1148, 1151-52 (7th Cir. 1987).
136. See Badhwar v. Dep't of the Air Force, 829 F.2d 182, 182-83 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
137. See N.Y. Times Co. v. NASA, 782 F. Supp. 628, 629 (D.D.C. 1991).
138. See id. at 630; Badhwar, 829 F.2d at 183.
139. See Hale v. Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 894, 896 (10th Cir. 1992).
140. See Marzen, 825 F.2d at 1151.
141. See Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 168 (1991).
142. See Lesar v. Dep't of Justice, 455 F. Supp. 921 (D.D.C. 1978).
143. Id. at 925.
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embarrass Dr. King's family.""' Lesar represents a broad reading of
exemption 7(C)'s legislative history, which suggests only that
confidentiality is protected to prevent harm from befalling an individual,
or his family, because the individual cooperated with law enforcement
authorities.' In recognizing the King's family possible embarrassment by
disclosure (which historians assert involve information about his
extramarital affairs) the D.C. Circuit equated the exemption's personal
privacy protection to include emotional harm.' 6
In Badhwar v. Departmentof the Air Force'4 7 the first exemption 6
case to recognize family-privacy rights, the D.C. Circuit held in 1987 that
some parts of an autopsy report clearly might "shock the sensibilities of
surviving kin" and should therefore be exempt.'48 Badhwar concerned a
FOIA request by journalists seeking autopsy records from the Army, Navy,
and Air Force involving military aircraft accidents.'49 It is noteworthy that
the appellate court recognized family-privacy rights under exemption 6,
because exemption 6's "clearly unwarranted invasion" of privacy standard
represents a stricter standard for nondisclosure than exemption 7(C);
exemption 6 is more disclosure-friendly. 50 Moreover, the D.C. Circuit
again expanded the notion of personal privacy, as it did in Lesar,'5 '
to include emotional distress. 5 2 Badhwar is also important in the
development of family-privacy rights because it was the first in a line of
cases that specifically concerned FOIA requests for photos of death scenes
and autopsy records.
In its next exemption 6 family-privacy case, the D.C. Circuit again
ruled in favor of government nondisclosure by reversing a D.C. district
court decision granting summary judgment to the New York Times
regarding information about the 1986 explosion of the Challenger space
shuttle. 5 3 In New York Times v. NASA, the New York Times filed a FOIA
request for audio tapes of conversations between the shuttle astronauts and
NASA controllers at the Kennedy Space Center in Cape Canaveral,

144. Lesar v. Dep't of Justice, 636 F.2d 472, 486-88 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
145. 1974 FOIA SOURCE BOOK, supra note 69, at 519-20; see also supratext accompanying
note 69.
146. Lesar, 636 F.2d at 486-88.
147. 829 F.2d 182 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
148. Id. at 185-86.
149. Id. at 183.
150. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)6 & 552(b)7(C).
151. See supra text accompanying notes 142-46.
152. See Badhwar, 829 F.2d at 185-86.
153. See N.Y. Times v. NASA, 920 F.2d 1002 (D.C. Cir., en banc, 1990), rev'g N.Y. Times
Co. v. NASA, 782 F. Supp. 628 (D.D.C. 1991).
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Florida. 154 The shuttle exploded seventy-three seconds after liftoff, killing
all seven of the astronauts on board. The Times proposed that the
astronauts' voices and background sounds during those final moments
55
could provide important and newsworthy information about the disaster.
NASA released a transcript of the taped conversations but withheld the
actual tapes, arguing that disclosure would constitute a "clearly
unwarranted invasion of privacy" under exemption 6.156 After the D.C.
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the newspaper,' 57 the
D.C. Circuit Court reversed and remanded the case to determine whether
any invasion of privacy endured by the astronauts' families would be
"clearly unwarranted" when balanced against the public interest in
disclosure. 5 8 On remand, the district court found that the privacy rights of
' and rejected the Times's
the crew's family members were substantial 59
contention that the public interest served by the tape's disclosure
outweighed the families' privacy interests."6 The district court concluded
that "[e]xposure to the voice of a beloved family member immediately
prior to that family member's death is what would cause the Challenger
families pain."'' The district court, using reasoning closely paralleling the
Supreme Court's rationale in Favish, declared that disclosure would
subject family members to "a barrage of mailings and personal
solicitations" along with a "panoply of telephone calls from media groups
as well as a disruption of their peace of mind every time a portion of the
tape is played within their hearing. ,162
In a Seventh Circuit case involving access to medical information, the
court of appeals upheld a decision regarding the nondisclosure of the
medical records of an infant who died in a highly publicized incident
involving the propriety of withholding medical treatment. 163 In Marzen v.
HealthandHuman Services, a baby diagnosed with Down's syndrome and
a blocked esophagus died in an Indiana hospital six days after birth.'64 The
parents' controversial decision against surgery or any other treatment,
except sedation, to correct the blocked esophagus was followed by the

154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.

N.Y. Times v. NASA, 782 F. Supp. 628, 630 (D.D.C. 1991).
Id. at 633.
Id. at 630
N.Y. Times v. NASA, 679 F. Supp. 33, 34 (D.D.C. 1987).
N.Y Times, 920 F.2d at 1010.
N.Y. Times, 782 F. Supp. at 632.
Id.
Id. at 631.
Id. at 632.
Marzen v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 825 F.2d 1148 (7th Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1150-51.
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public. 165 After the baby's death, officials conducted a series of court and
medical hearings, including an investigation by the Department of Health
and Human Services (HHS), a financial supporter of the hospital. 166 A
medical-care public-interest group requested the baby's medical records
from the HHS, which refused to release the information. 167 The Seventh
Circuit upheld the HHS decision to withhold the records under exemption
7(C). 168 The appellate panel acknowledged that while the circumstances
surrounding the baby's death were of "substantial public interest,"'169 if the
documents were released "many would learn the intimate details connected
with the family's ordeal,""17 and
disclosure "would certainly cause Infant
'
Doe's parents more anguish."'
In Hale v. Departmentof Justice,the Tenth Circuit recognized familyprivacy rights under exemption 7(C) and held that the privacy interests of
a murder victim's family must be weighed against the public interest of
disclosing photos of the victim.172 The Tenth Circuit rejected a request for
autopsy records sought by the man sentenced to death for killing the
victim. 173 The photos were among numerous documents requested by the
killer in his effort to argue that he did not receive a fair trial.'74 The Tenth
Circuit concluded it could not "discern any public interest in the
photographs of the deceased victim, let alone one that would outweigh the
personal privacy interests of the victim's family."'75 Hale is one of a series
of cases in which courts have recognized family-privacy rights under
exemptions 6 or 7(C) to reject FOIA requests by convicted felons seeking
photos of their victims.'76
The weight of authority, as represented in this line of cases, holds that
personal privacy interests protected by exemptions 6 and 7(C) extend to
family members of a decedent identified in an agency record sought under

165. Id.at 1150.
166. Id.at 1151.
167. Id.
168. Marzen, 825 .2d at 1154.
169. Id. at 1153-54.
170. Id.at 1152.
171. Id. at 1153-54.
172. Hale v. Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1992).
173. Id. at 902.
174. Id. at 896-97.
175. Id. at 902.
176. See, e.g., Coleman v. FBI, 13 F. Supp. 2d 75 (D.D.C. 1998); Epps v. Dep't ofJustice, 801
F. Supp. 787 (D.D.C. 1992); Isley v. Executive Office for U.S. Attorneys, No. 98-5098, 1999 WL
1021934 (D.D.C. Feb. 15, 1998).
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the FOIA.' 77 These cases also demonstrate how Favish's argument was
fundamentally flawed. He contended that exemption 7(C)'s privacy
protection is limited only to "the right to control information about
' In doing so, Favish erroneously
oneself." 78
relied on a theory of tortious
invasion of privacy. While it is true that under tort jurisprudence, privacy
rights are generally for the living, 179 courts have explicitly recognized a
difference between tortious invasion of privacy and privacy rights
protected under the FOIA. 8 ° As the Supreme Court noted in 1989, FOIA
statutory rights of privacy are not the same as tort actions for invasion of
privacy or constitutional protections for privacy.18'
Thus when the Favish Court held that FOIA's statutory scheme
includes the protection of surviving family members "with respect to their
close relatives' death scene images,"82 justices endorsed a quarter-century
of established lower court FOIA jurisprudence. 83 The Court turned next

177. See supra text accompanying note 14. In some FOIA cases, courts recognized familyprivacy rights but held in favor of releasing the materials on the ground that the public interest in
disclosure outweighed the privacy interests of the survivors. Dow Jones & Co. v. Dep't of Justice,
No. 94 Civ. 0527, 1995 WL 6155, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 9, 1995) (holding that the suicide note left
by former deputy White House counsel Vincent Foster falls outside exemption 7(C)'s protection
because the public interest in disclosure of the note outweighed the survivors' privacy interests);
Outlaw v. Dep't of the Army, 815 F. Supp. 505, 506 (D.D.C. 1993) (holding there was no
substantial exemption 7(C) privacy interest in 25-year-old photographs of a murder victim, absent
a showing that there were surviving relatives who would be offended); Journal-Gazette Co. v. Dep't
of the Army, No. F89-147, slip op., at 8-9 (N.D. Ind. Jan. 8, 1990) (holding that because the
autopsy report of an Air National Guard pilot killed in a training exercise contained "concise
medical descriptions of the cause of death," not "graphic, morbid descriptions," the survivor's
minimal exemption 6 privacy interest was outweighed by the public interest).
178. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 165 (2004).
179. The Restatement (Second) of Torts notes that, with the exception of appropriating
someone's likeness or image, an action for invasion of privacy "can be maintained only by a living
individual whose privacy is invaded." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 652B (1977). Tortious
claims for invasion of privacy have been recognized in state statutes and common law, and have
given rise to four civil causes of action: appropriation, intrusion, publicity about private
information, and false light. KEETON ET AL., supra note 129, at 849-68.
180. See, e.g., Kiraly v. FBI, 728 F.2d 273,277-78 (6th Cir. 1984) (distinguishing tort privacy
rights from FOIA privacy rights in exemption 7(C), holding that the latter does not lapse upon
death). State courts have also followed this general rule. See, e.g., Felsher v. Univ. of Evansville,
755 N.E.2d 589 (Ind. 2001) (The [tortious privacy] cause of action is not assignable, and it cannot
be maintained by other persons.").
181. See Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762
n. 13 (1989) (citations omitted).
182. Favish, 541 U.S. at 170.
183. See supra text accompanying notes 142-181.
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to the question of whether the Foster family's privacy
184 rights outweighed
photographs.
the
of
disclosure
in
interest
the public
2. Defining the Privacy-Related Public Interest
At the outset of the Court's balancing analysis, Justice Kennedy
acknowledged that the FOIA explicitly embodies a presumption in favor
of disclosure. Kennedy noted that, as a general rule, when documents are
requested under the FOIA, requesters should not be required to explain
why they seek the information, nor should they need a preconceived idea
of the uses the information might serve. 85 He added, however, that when
disclosure involves matters covered by FOIA's privacy exemptions, "the
usual rule that the citizen need not offer a reason for requesting the
information must be inapplicable."' 86
The Court acknowledged that exemption 7(C) requires it to protect "the
personal privacy of citizens against the uncontrolled release of information
compiled through the power of the state. '187 To balance the right of
disclosure against the protections provided by exemption 7(C) "to the
proper degree" and in a practical and consistent way, the Court concluded
that a FOIA requester must establish a "sufficient reason" for obtaining the
'
documents. 88
Based on this rationale, the Court crafted a two-prong "sufficient
reason" test to establish whether disclosure would result in an
"unwarranted invasion of privacy." '89 First, the FOIA requester must show
that the "public interest sought to be advanced is a significant one, an
190
interest more specific than having the information for its own sake."
Second, the requester must show that the information is likely to advance
that interest. 191 To pass the sufficient reason test, both criteria must be met.
"Otherwise," Justice Kennedy declared, "the invasion of privacy is
unwarranted.' ' 192 Kennedy explained that this new test lends "some
stability with respect to both the specific category of personal privacy
interests protected by the statute and the specific category of public

184.
185.
186.
187.
188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Favish, 541 U.S. at 171.
Id.at 172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Favish, 541 U.S. at 172.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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interests that could outweigh the privacy claim."' 9 3 Without such limits, he
explained, courts would be "left to balance in an ad hoc manner with little
or no real guidance."' 94
The Court then addressed Favish's FOIA request which sought the
photos to determine if the government acted negligently or improperly in
its investigation of Foster's death.' 9 Reasoning that "allegations of
' 196
government misconduct are 'easy to allege and hard' to disprove,"
Justice Kennedy declared that a specific standard must be met to satisfy the
''sufficient reason" test in such instances:
[Where] the public interest being asserted is to show that
responsible officials acted negligently or otherwise improperly in
the performance of their duties, the requester must establish more
than a bare suspicion in order to obtain disclosure. Rather, the
requester must produce evidence that would warrant a belief by a
reasonable person that the alleged Government impropriety might
have occurred. 197

Any lesser standard would require courts "to engage in a state of
18
suspended disbelief with regard to even the most incredible allegations. 9
Justice Kennedy wrote that it would be "quite extraordinary to say we must
ignore the fact that five different inquiries into the Foster matter reached
the same conclusion."99 He explained that the Court based this standard
on a "general working principle" that there is a "presumption of
legitimacy" accorded to official conduct and government reports: 2°° "[I]n
the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that [public
officials] have properly discharged their official duties."201
To arrive at this requirement, the Court relied principally on a 1991
exemption 6 case, Department of State v. Ray.2 °2 The Ray Court held that
under exemption 6, the government could withhold the names and contact
information of Haitians who had fled to the United States and were

193.
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.

Id. at 173.
Favish, 541 U.S. at 173.
Id.
Id.at 175 (citing Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 585 (1998)).
Id.at 174.
Id.at 173-74.
Favish, 541 U.S. at 175.
Id.at 174 (citing Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 178-79 (1991)).
Id.(quoting United States v. Annstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996)).
502 U.S. 164 (1991).
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subsequently deported." 3 Ray holds special significance for the Favish
decision for two reasons. First, to reach its conclusion that disclosure of
this information would constitute a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of
privacy," the Ray Court reasoned that identifying deported Haitians could
subject them or their families to "embarrassment in their social and
community relationships" in Haiti 05 Although this matter of familyprivacy was raised in dicta not central to the holding, Ray represents the
first time the Supreme Court discussed this issue. Second, the Ray Court
held for the first time in any FOIA case that "records and official conduct"
are accorded a presumption of legitimacy and are presumed to be accurate
and truthful.2°6
Ray involved a Florida lawyer's request of State Department files on
Haitians who had fled to the United States to escape a depressed economy
and dictatorial government.2 "7 The lawyer sought to argue that his clients
should not be deported because they would be the targets of retaliation by
the Haitian authorities.2"8 He requested the files so that he could contact
and interview Haitian returnees. 20 In response to the FOIA request, the
State Department released 96 pages of information, but redacted the names
of the returned Haitians - along with other identifying details such as
their living conditions, children, marital status, and employment status. 10
The government argued that to disclose that information would constitute
6.211
a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of privacy under exemption
To obtain the documents, the attorney filed suit against the State
Department in U.S. District Court of the Southern District of Florida. The
government argued that there was no reason for the attorney's clients to
fear retaliation because the Haitian government assured the State
Department that it would not prosecute or harass the returnees. 12 Further,
the State Department assured it had monitored the treatment of returnees
for two years and found only two or three instances of harassment out of
more than 800 returnees.21 3 The attorney argued that he wanted to conduct
an independent investigation to determine whether the Haitian government

203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See id.
See Ray, 502 U.S. at 177-79.
Id. at 175-76.
Id. at 179.
Id. at 167-68.
Id. at 168.
Ray, 502 U.S. at 175.
Id.
Id.
See id. at 168.
Id. at 168-69.
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was complying with its agreement with the U.S. government, and whether
the State Department followed through on its promise to monitor the
treatment of the deportees.2! 4 The district court ordered the State
Department to release the redacted information, holding that the privacy
interests were minimal and were outweighed by the public interest in
ensuring the government protected the returned Haitians. 5 The U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.216 The Eleventh
Circuit acknowledged that "significant privacy interests" were at stake, but
concluded that the public interest in disclosure outweighed those privacy
interests.217 The appellate court reasoned that the American public had a
right to know whether the State Department made sure that Haiti was
complying with its agreement not to persecute the deportees. 18
The Supreme Court held that under exemption 6, disclosure of the
identifying information was a "clearly unwarranted" invasion of privacy,
and reversed the Eleventh Circuit's ruling.21 9 Justice Stevens, who wrote
the Court's unanimous opinion, said the information was protected under
exemption 6 because the records would disclose highly personal
information about the Haitians,22° would violate assurances of
confidentiality given by the State Department to the deported Haitian
interviewees, 22' and might expose them to persecution, mistreatment or
other retaliatory actions.2 22 Moreover, Justice Stevens wrote that
disclosure could subject the deportees or their families to "embarrassment
223
in their social and community relationships" in Haiti.
In a final point Justice Stevens asserted that there was a "presumption
of legitimacy" in connection with government "records and official
conduct., 224 Because there was no evidence "to impugn the integrity of the
reports," the government's investigation into the treatment of the returned
Haitians was presumed to be accurate and proper.2 25 He reasoned that "[i]f
a totally unsupported suggestion that the interest in finding out whether
Government agents have been telling the truth justified disclosure of

214.
215.
216.
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.
222.
223.
224.
225.

Ray, 502 U.S. at 176, 178.
Id. at 170.
Ray v. Dep't of Justice, 908 F.2d 1549, 1552 (1990).
Id. at 1555.
Id.
Ray, 502 U.S. at 179.
Id. at 175.
Id. at 177.
Id. at 176 n.12.
Id. at 176.
Ray, 502 U.S. at 179.
Id.

UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 16

private materials, Government agencies would have no defense against
requests for production of private information. 226
Applying the Ray Court's "presumption of legitimacy" doctrine, the
Court found that Favish had not provided any evidence that "would
warrant a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged government

impropriety might have occurred." 227 The Court thus concluded that the

Foster family's privacy interests outweighed the public interest in
disclosure, and granted the OIC's motion for summary judgment with
respect to the four disputed photos.228
IV. FAR-REACHING IMPLICATIONS FOR PUBLIC ACCESS
The Supreme Court's authority to endorse family privacy rights derives
in great part from a lack of clear legislative history behind FOIA' s broadly
worded privacy exemptions 6 and 7(C).2 29 Courts are left to interpret the
meaning of these exemptions. The Senate report that accompanied the
original FOIA legislation stated only that shielding "an individual's private
affairs from unnecessary public scrutiny" must be balanced against the
public's right of access to government-held information. 23" The
accompanying House report said that a "clearly unwarranted invasion of
privacy" provides the proper balance between the protection of an
231
individual's right of privacy and the public interest in disclosure.
Congress left key language undefined, including the phrases "could
reasonably be expected" or "unwarranted invasion of personal privacy" in
exemption 7(C), and the phrase "would constitute a clearly unwarranted
invasion of privacy" in exemption 6.232 Further, neither exemption
identifies whose personal privacy cannot be unjustifiably invaded.
As the Ninth Circuit observed in its Favish analysis, questions about
the statutory meaning of exemption 7(C) are "not free from difficulty due
to the imprecision" of the statutory language.233 As a result, the Supreme

226. Id.
227. Nat'l Archives and Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 175 (2004).
228. Id.
229. 5 U.S.C. §§ 552(b)6 & 552(b)7(C).
230. S. REP. No. 89-813, at 9 (1965) (emphasis added).
231. H.R. REP. No. 89-1497, at 4 (1966).
232. Michael Hoefges, Martin E. Halstuk & Bill F. Chamberlin, PrivacyRights Versus FOJA
DisclosurePolicy: The "Uses and Effects" Double Standardin Access to PersonallyIdentifiable
Information in Government Records, 12 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1, 14 (2003).
233. Favish v. Office of the Indep. Counsel, 217 F. 3d 1168, 1173 (9th Cir. 2000).
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Court has clarified the privacy exemptions and shaped the contours of the
law in significant respects.234
A. Shaping the Contours of the FOIA
In Departmentof the Air Force v. Rose, the first FOIA privacy case to
reach the U.S. Supreme Court, the Court held that Congress intended for
a disclosure determination to be based on a balancing analysis that weighs
"the individual's right of privacy against the preservation of the basic
purpose of the Freedom of Information Act 'to open agency action to the
light of public scrutiny."' 235 Justice Brennan, who wrote the majority
opinion for the Court, noted that exemption 6 does not exempt every
incidental invasion of privacy, but rather protects only those disclosures
that would constitute "clearly unwarranted" invasions of personal
privacy. 23 6 However, the Rose Court did not define the term "clearly
unwarranted."
The Court clarified its position on "incidental" invasions of privacy in
Department of State v. Washington Post Co

237

The Court held that even

a minimal privacy interest, one that touches on non-intimate information,
is sufficient to trigger exemption 6.238 Chief Justice Rehnquist, who wrote
the unanimous 1982 Court opinion, said that identifying information, such
as a person's place of birth, date of birth, date of marriage, employment
history and comparable data "is not normally regarded as highly personal,"

234. The Supreme Court has decided eight FOIA cases involving exemptions 6 and 7(C). See
Favish, 541 U.S. at 157; Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997); Dep't of Def.
v. Fed. Labor Relations Auth., 510 U.S. 487 (1994); Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164 (1991);
Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989); FBI v.
Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982); Dep't of State v. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982); Dep't of
the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976). All of these cases concerned the personal privacy
exemption, 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)6, or the privacy subsection of the law enforcement exemption, 5
U.S.C. § 552(b)7(c).
235. Rose, 425 U.S. at 372. The Rose Court upheld a request by the student editors of the New
York University Law Review for summaries of ethics hearings at the Air Force Academy. The
student editors wanted the information as background for an article on disciplinary procedures in
the service academies. Id.at 354-56. The hearings explored charges of student cadets cheating or
in other ways breaking the strict honor codes at the academies. The Air Force rejected the request
for the hearings summaries and refused to provide the documents, even with the names and
identifying facts redacted. Id. at 356. The Air Force cited exemption 6's privacy interest, asserting
that disclosure would mark the offenders for the rest of their careers. The Rose Court held that
disclosure of the information - with names redacted - revealed disciplinary actions against
military cadets and thus fell under the "basic purpose" of the FOIA. Id.at 376-381.
236. Id.
237. Wash. Post Co., 456 U.S. at 595.
238. Id.at 600-02.
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but would nonetheless be exempt if disclosure would constitute "a clearly

unwarranted" invasion of personal privacy. 23 9 The Washington Post

decision was especially significant because it provides a basis for federal
agencies to refuse a FOIA request on the ground that a record contains
identifying information on an individual. 2' But again, the Court did not
clarify when an invasion of privacy would be "clearly unwarranted."
Seven years later, in a landmark FOIA privacy decision, the Supreme
Court significantly narrowed the scope of the FOIA's public interest
standard.2 41 In Department of Justicev. ReportersCommitteefor Freedom

of the Press, an exemption 7(C) matter, a unanimous Court held that the
FOIA's "central purpose is to ensure that the government's activities be
opened to the sharp eye of public scrutiny, not that information about
private citizens that happens to be in the warehouse of the government be
so disclosed."24 2 Justice Stevens writing for the Court, emphasized that the
statute's purpose is to enable the public to evaluate government operations
and performance. 243 The Court thus concluded that the only FOIA-related
public interest cognizable in a privacy challenge is that of revealing
"agency action" that directly "shed[s] light on the conduct of any
Governmental agency or official." 2 "
239. Id.at 600. The Court upheld the government's decision to withhold information sought
by the newspaper regarding two prominent Iranians. In September 1979- a period of great tension
between the United States and Iran following the Iranian revolution- the WashingtonPost wanted
to confirm an unofficial report that two officials of Iran's revolutionary, anti-American government
were traveling under U.S. passports. Id.at 596. The State Department cited exemption 6 and
asserted that the passport information would qualify as "similar files," and that disclosure would
be a "clearly unwarranted invasion of privacy." Id. According to Rehnquist's interpretation of
House and Senate reports, which he noted did not define "similar files," Congress intended for
exemption 6 "to protect individuals from the injury and embarrassment that can result from the
unnecessary disclosure of personal information." Id. at 599.
240. See, e.g., Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997); Dep't of Def. v.
FLRA, 510 U.S. 487 (1994).
241. See Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 772-73
(1989). The Court held that the FBI can withhold "rap sheets" on private citizens even though the
information might be available in public records at local or state offices. The Court reasoned that
the disclosure of compilations of an individual's criminal records is an "unwarranted" invasion of
privacy under exemption 7(C) because rap sheets do not reveal information about how government
operates and thus fall "outside the ambit of the public interest that the FOIA was enacted to serve."
Id. at 775.
242. Id. at 774.
243. Id.
244. Id.at 772-73. The Reporters Committee decision is arguably the most controversial FOIA
decision ever decided by the U.S. Supreme Court. It unleashed a wave of criticism from legal
commentators, jurists, and congressional lawmakers. In a concurring opinion to Reporters
Committee, Justice Blackmun agreed with the Court's outcome but argued that the Court's rationale
was overbroad and unsound. Id.at 780-81 (Blackmun, J., concurring). He contended that the Court
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The Court's holdings in Rose, Washington Post, and Reporters
Committee clarified the FOIA's public interest standard in significant
respects, but it was not until National Archives and Records
Administrationv. Favishthat the Supreme Court finally established criteria
that explicitly 45spelled out when an invasion of privacy would be
"unwarranted.' In the Court's view, the Ninth Circuit correctly ruled that
Foster's family had a privacy interest protected by the FOIA, 246 and that
there was a significant public interest in "uncovering deficiencies or
misfeasance in the Government's investigations into Foster's death." 247
However, the Favish Court rejected the Ninth Circuit's rationale and
overrode the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the FOIA public interest
standard,24 8 replacing it with the "sufficient reason" test.249
B. The "Sufficient Reason" Test

The Supreme Court acknowledged that the FOIA makes agency records
available to "any person" upon request,250 places the burden of justifying

opinion exempting "all" rap sheet information from the FOIA's disclosure requirements conflicted
with exemption 7(C)'s plain language, legislative history, and case law. Id. (Blackmun, J.,
concurring). In a concurring opinion in a 1994 FOIA exemption 6 case, Justice Ginsburg rejected
the Court's definition of the FOIA's "central purpose." She wrote that the Reporters Committee
"central purpose" definition cannot be found anywhere in the FOIA's language and argued that the
Reporters Committee Court was wrong to restrict the FOIA's public interest standard to only that
information that directly sheds light on government activities and operations. Dep't of Defense v.
FLRA, 510 U.S. 487, 509 (1994) (Ginsburg, J.,
concurring). In the Senate report that accompanied
the 1996 amendments to the FOIA, Sen. Patrick Leahy wrote that the FOIA's purpose is not limited
merely to disclosing only those records that would reveal the workings of government and official
conduct. He said the Court's "central purpose" definition "imposes a limitation on the FOIA which
Congress did not intend and which cannot be found in its language, and distorts the broader import
of the Act in effectuating Government openness." S. REP. No. 104-272, at 26-27 (1996),
accompanyingElectronic Freedom of Information Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-231, §§ 1-12 (110 Stat.
3048-054) (1996) (amending sections of 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1994)). See also Martin E. Halstuk &
Charles N. Davis, The Public Interest Be Damned. Lower Court Treatment of the Reporters
Committee "CentralPurpose" Reformulation, 54 ADMIN. L. REv. 983, 990 (2002) (noting that
FAA airline maintenance records, results of FDA clinical trials, and census and economic data
compiled bythe Department of Commerce all contain information that is of high public interest but
that does not necessarily shed light on government operations and conduct as required by the
"central purpose" doctrine).
245. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004).
246. Id. at 173.
247. Id.
248. Favish v. Office of the Indep. Counsel, 217 F.3d 1168, 1172-73 (9th Cir. 2000).
249. Favish, 541 U.S. at 175.
250. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (2000).
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nondisclosure on the government,"' and permits requests without
requiring a showing of relevancy or an explanation for a request. 2
However, the Court added that under the congressionally prescribed
balancing analysis, the usual rules do not apply.253 It becomes necessary,
the Court held, to define the public interest in order to produce "a
counterweight on the FOIA scale" against the privacy interests in the
requested records.254 The Court crafted the "sufficient reason" test to
provide such a counterweight. 2 5 Under this test, when personal-privacy
exemption 7(C) is triggered, the FOIA requester must demonstrate a
"sufficient reason for the disclosure., 256 Under this test, the requester must
show first that "the public interest sought to be advanced is a significant
one, '257 and second, that the information "is likely to advance that
interest." Otherwise, the invasion of privacy is unwarranted.2 58
The "sufficient reason" test's first prong properly recognizes that while
there is a potential for an invasion of privacy whenever a FOIA requester
seeks information on someone, the privacy exemptions do not protect
against all invasions of privacy - only "unwarranted" invasions of
privacy. 259 It therefore makes sense to require a requester to show that a
significant public interest is at stake in order to overcome this statutory
exception. This first prong of the "sufficient reason" test provides for a
practical and meaningful balancing analysis while it also comports with
26 1
both the FOIA's plain text meaning 2' and Congress's legislative intent.
It is significant to note that Favish reached the Court against the current
backdrop of sharply heightened awareness about the powerful impact of
communications and information technology on privacy. The Favish

251. Id. § 552(a)(4)(B)(b); see also NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214,234,
236 (1977); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 79, 87 (1973).
252. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a); see also Durns v. Bureau of Prisons, 804 F.2d 701, 706 (D.C. Cir.
1986) ("Congress granted the scholar and the scoundrel equal rights of access to agency records"),
cert. grantedjudgmentvacatedon othergrounds andremanded,486 U.S. 1029 (1988); Forsham
v. Califano, 587 F.2d 1128, 1134 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (reasoning that while factors such as need,
interest, or public interest may bear upon an agency's determination of processing order, these
factors have no bearing on a person's right of access under the FOIA).
253. Favish, 541 U.S. at 175; see also supratext accompanying notes 185-88.
254. Favish, 541 U.S. at 174.
255. Id. at 174-75.
256. Id. at 172.
257. Id.
258. Id.
259. Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352, 382 (1976).
260. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2000).
261. See, e.g., SEN. REP. No. 813, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 9 (1965) & H. REP. No. 89-1497,
at 4 (1966); see also supra text accompanying notes 25-48 & 52-60.
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Court seemed concerned about the consequences of the instant,
unregulated and phenomenally widespread dissemination of information
on the Internet. Justice Kennedy's opinion quoted Sheila Anthony Foster's
objections at length, particularly her reference to the vast scope of the
potential invasion of privacy that Internet publication of the photos could
produce.262
The impact of mass dissemination of the photos on the Internet was
raised during oral arguments before the Supreme Court. James Hamilton,
the Foster family attorney, emphasized that the invasion of privacy would
not be limited to "photographs on television and in grocery store tabloids,"
but would also include display "in virtual perpetuity on ghoulish web sites
that show death and carnage. "263 Patricia A. Millett, a Justice Department
attorney representing the government at oral arguments, added, "You
won't need to go to Findadeath.com" if the photos were released. 264 She
also pointed out that the Foster photos would be published not only on
privately operated Internet web sites but also on government web sites.265
Millett explained that under the 1996 FOIA amendments, the government
is required to post requested information on government web sites if the
government anticipates three or more FOIA requests for that
information.266
The Supreme Court's concern about the impact of technology on
FOIA-related privacy interests is not new. The Court first addressed this
issue when it decided the 1989 Reporters Committee decision and upheld
nondisclosure of a computerized FBI "rap sheet" on a Pennsylvania
businessman linked to the mob. 267 This FOIA privacy dispute arose after
the late CBS investigative reporter Robert Schakne requested the rap sheet
on Charles Medico, who was identified by the Pennsylvania Crime
Commission as an owner of Medico Industries, a legitimate business
dominated by organized-crime figures.268 Medico's company allegedly

262. Favish, 541 U.S. at 167. "I fear that the release of [additional] photographs certainly
would set off another round of intense scrutiny by the media. Undoubtedly, the photographs would
be placed on the Internet for world consumption. Once again my family would be the focus of
conceivably unsavory and distasteful media coverage." Id.
263. Transcript of Oral Arguments Before the U.S. Supreme Court, Office of Indep. Counsel
v. Favish, No. 02-954, Dec. 3, 2003, at 17.
264. Id. at 50.
265. Id.
266. Id.
267. See Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989).
268. Id. at 757.
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received defense contracts in exchange for political contributions to former
U.S. Rep. Daniel J. Flood.269
As noted earlier in this Article, the Reporters Committee decision was
a landmark FOIA privacy case because it defined FOIA's "central
purpose.,,270 However, the Court's rationale also included a discussion on

the impact of technology on privacy. Justice Stevens reasoned that
Medico's "substantial" privacy interest in his criminal history information
was grounded in the "vast difference" between public records that can be
obtained by searching court and police files throughout the country and a
"computerized summary" of those records stored in a "single
clearinghouse of information., 271 Justice Stevens explained that the
"substantial character of that interest is affected by the fact that in today's
society the computer can accumulate and store information that would
a person attains age 80,
otherwise have surely been forgotten long'2 7before
2
when the FBI's rap sheets are discarded.
In its Favish analysis, the Supreme Court again considered the impact
of technology on personal privacy. As Justice Kennedy suggested, the
FOIA does not provide a mechanism to prevent "extensive" invasions of
privacy of the type possible through mass Internet dissemination.273 When
information is disclosed, Kennedy noted, courts do not have an option,
such as a protective order, to restrict access only to the FOIA requester.274
Once government-held information is released to the public, it belongs to
the public. 275 The tremendous impact of communications and information
technology on privacy explains the Favish Court's rationale in compelling
a FOIA requester to demonstrate a significant public interest in the records
sought.
However, the second prong of the "sufficient reason" test presents a
loophole that can be exploited by federal agencies motivated to withhold
information. Prong two requires that a FOIA requester must establish that

269. Flood, a Pennsylvania Democrat, resigned from the House Jan. 31, 1980 while under
indictment. He later pleaded guilty to conspiracy to violate federal campaign laws. He was
convicted of conspiracy to solicit campaign contributions from persons seeking federal government
contracts and was placed on probation for one year. See Laura Kiernan, Flood is Placedon Year's
Probation,WASH. POST, Feb. 27, 1980, at A8. See also Martin E. Halstuk & Charles Davis, The
Public Interest Be Damned: Lower Court Treatment of the Reporters Committee "Central
Purpose" Reformulation, 54 ADMIN L. REv. 983, 988 (2002).
270. See supra text accompanying notes 241-65.
271. Reporters Comm., 489 U.S. at 764.
272. Id.at 771.
273. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157, 174 (2004).
274. Id.
275. Id.
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disclosure of the requested materials is likely to advance a significant
public interest. 276 The difficulty here is that the government can argue that
an asserted public interest has been served, or diminished, if an agency has
already released a large amount of information in response to a request.
The government may also contend that the public interest in information
has been diminished if some information contained in the requested
records has leaked to the press or another party (or otherwise obtained) and
widely publicized.
Indeed, the Office of the Independent Counsel argued this latter point
in Favish. The government asserted that the public interest was
substantially diminished by a photo of Foster's hand clutching his gun.
This same picture had previously been leaked to Time magazine and ABC
News and published. 77 As suggested in an amicus brief filed by a coalition
of the nation's leading media organizations, the second-prong requirement
would give the government a "perverse incentive . . .to release large

quantities of relevant (or even not particularly relevant) information while
holding back the most embarrassing or damaging material. 278
The potential for such tactics is especially high under the Department
of Justice's current FOIA policy. In a memorandum issued by former
Attorney General John Ashcroft, and still in effect, federal agencies are
directed to be especially vigilant of privacy concerns when reviewing
FOIA requests. Ashcroft urged federal agencies to use the statute's privacy
of agency records as long as there is a
exemptions to resist disclosure
"sound legal basis" to do SO. 279
C. The "Presumptionof Legitimacy" Doctrine
Prong two of the "sufficient reason" test offers federal agencies an
opportunity to circumvent the FOIA's disclosure mandate. But a far more
276. Id.at 174.
277. See supra text accompanying note 126.
278. See Brief for Amici CuriaeReporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, at 21, Office
of Indep. Counsel v. Favish, 217 F. 3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 02-954).
279. See U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Information and Privacy, FOIA Post, New
Attorney General Memorandum Issued, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/oip/foiapost/
2001 foiapostl 9.htm (last visited May 17, 2005); see also Critics Say New Rules Limit Access to
Records, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27,2002, at A-18; Martin E. Halstuk, In Review: The Threat to Freedom
ofInformation, COLUM. JOURNALISM REv. Jan./Feb. 2002, at 8. In this substantial revision ofFOIA
policy, Attorney General John Ashcroft established a new and restrictive administration policy on
how executive-branch agencies should treat requests for federal records under the FOIA. In his
October 12,2001 memorandum to the federal agencies, Ashcroft rescinded the 1993 FOIA standard
set by former Attorney General Janet Reno, who had urged agencies to release government-held
information unless there was "foreseeable harm" in their disclosure.
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serious and truly disturbing problem concerns the Favish Court's
"presumption of legitimacy" doctrine. 280 Reasoning that "allegations of
government misconduct are 'easy to allege and hard' to disprove,, 28' the
Court held that when a requester's asserted public interest is to investigate
government malfeasance, the requester must produce evidence that
supports a belief by a reasonable person that the alleged wrongdoing might
have occurred.282
As discussed earlier, the Court's basis for this doctrine derives
principally from Departmentof State v. Ray, in which the Court held that
there is a "presumption of legitimacy" accorded by courts to official
conduct and government reports. 283 A glaring problem with the Favish
Court's "presumption of legitimacy" doctrine is its circular reasoning; it
requires a FOIA requester to show evidence of wrongdoing in advance to
justify getting access to a document sought for the purpose of investigating
wrongdoing. The problem is that when journalists, historians, or others
investigate government malfeasance or incompetence, the only documents
that can reveal evidence of government misconduct are often in the
government's possession. 21 It is one thing for the Supreme Court to
recognize a presumption of legitimacy of government conduct as a general
principle, and to permit the government to argue against disclosure on such
grounds. It is an entirely different matter to turn a principle into a condition
of disclosure. Such an extraordinarily restrictive standard acts as an
exemption to disclosure that would circumvent the meaningful balancing
test that Congress explicitly prescribed to settle a FOIA privacy dispute.
Furthermore, the "presumption of legitimacy" is totally unsupported in
the statute's language, its legislative history, or in any U.S. Supreme Court
FOIA opinions prior to Ray.285 In invoking the presumption of legitimacy
doctrine, the Favish Court cited three earlier Supreme Court rulings.
However, none of these cases involved the FOIA. These decisions included
a 1926 ruling that upheld the validity of patent orders issued by the federal

280.
281.
282.
283.

Favish, 541 U.S. at 174-75.
Id. at 175.
Id.
Dep't of State v. Ray, 502 U.S. 164, 179 (1991); see supratext accompanying notes 200-

26.
284. See Brief for Amici CuriaeReporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, at 15, Office of
Indep. Counsel v. Favish, 217 F. 3d 1168 (9th Cir. 2000) (No. 02-954).
285. See Bibles v. Or. Natural Desert Ass'n, 519 U.S. 355 (1997); Dep't of Defense v. FLRA,
510 U.S. 487 (2000); Ray, 502 U.S. at 164; Dep't of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of
the Press, 489 U.S. 749 (1989); FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615 (1982); Dep't of State v. Wash.
Post Co., 456 U.S. 595 (1982); Dep't of the Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352 (1976).
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Alien Property Custodian during World War I;26 a 1996 holding that
a criminal defendant cannot inspect government documents that are
material to the preparation of a selective-prosecution claim;287 and a 1998
decision holding that under certain circumstances, a criminal defendant
must show "some evidence tending to show the existence" of
a claim that a corrections officer selectively
discrimination to prove
288
harassed the convict.
Even the government does not presume legitimacy in the conduct of
government officials. Indeed, Foster's death was investigated by the
National Park Police, the Federal Bureau of Investigation, separate
committees of the Senate and the House of Representatives and two
separate Offices of the Independent Counsel (OIC). 289 As the Ninth Circuit
observed in its Favish analysis: "[I]t is a feature of famous cases that they
generate controversy, suspicion, and the desire to second guess the
authorities."29 °
The extraordinarily restrictive "presumption of legitimacy" doctrine
creates a presumption of nondisclosure that plainly contravenes the
FOIA's statutory language and its congressional intent. 291 There is nothing
in the FOIA's statutory mandate that shields an agency from disclosing its
records simply because other agencies have engaged in similar
investigations. Moreover, the FOIA's legislative history recounts
numerous references to government misconduct and questionable agency

286. United States v. Chem. Found., Inc., 272 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1926) ("The presumption of
regularity supports the official acts of public officers and, in the absence of clear evidence to the
contrary, courts presume that they have properly discharged their official duties").
287. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456,464 (1996) (internal citations omitted) ("The
Attorney General and United States Attorneys retain 'broad discretion' to enforce the Nation's
criminal laws.... As a result, 'the presumption of regularity supports' their prosecutorial decisions
and, 'in the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have properly
discharged their official duties."').
288. Crawford-El v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 584-85 (1998).
The Court of Appeals' requirement of clear and convincing evidence of improper
motive is that court's latest effort to address a potentially serious problem: because
an official's state of mind is "easy to allege and hard to disprove," insubstantial
claims that turn on improper intent may be less amenable to summary disposition
that other types of claims against government officials.
Id.
289. See supra text accompanying notes 81-87.
290. Favish v. Office of the Indep. Counsel, 217 F. 3d 1168, 1173 (emphasis added).
291. See supra text accompanying notes 25-48 & 52-60.
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practices as the precise reasons for the statute's enactment."' This view
has been reinforced over time by several Supreme Court cases. A 1973
Court decision noted, for example, that the FOIA was enacted "to create
a judicially enforceable public right to secure such information from
' A 1978 Court decision held that the "basic
possibly unwilling hands."293
purpose of FOIA is to ensure an informed citizenry, vital to the functioning
of a democratic society, needed to check against corruption and to hold the
governors accountable to the governed.,

294

The Favish Court's rationale

for the "presumption of legitimacy" doctrine - that "allegations of
government misconduct are 'easy to allege and hard' to disprove" 295 - is
insufficient to negate this fundamental principle of democracy.

V. CONCLUSION

Although the issue of family-privacy rights under the FOIA was the
initial question before the U.S. Supreme Court in Favish v. National
Archives Administration2 96 the Court ultimately decided an issue of greater
consequence for access to public records. The Court created a device to
measure the public interest in a balancing test that weighs exemption 7(C)
privacy interests against the public interest in disclosure.29 7 In other words,
the Court established criteria to determine under what circumstances an
invasion of privacy would be "unwarranted." 298
As this Article has attempted to show, the U.S. Supreme Court was
well within its authority to recognize privacy protection for the family
members of deceased persons who are the subjects of FOIA record
requests. The statutory language of privacy exemptions 6 and 7(C) was
broadly worded by Congress, leaving interpretation of these exemptions
up to the courts. Furthermore, family-privacy rights protection has a long
legal tradition in the common law, in the FOIA's legislative history, and
in a quarter-century of FOIA decisions by the lower federal courts. Finally,
the family-privacy decision reflects the powerful and profound impacts on
privacy by communications and information technology, especially the
instant and mass dissemination made possible by the Internet.

292. See, e.g., S. REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965), H.R. REP. No. 104-795, at 7 (1996).
293. EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
294. NLRB v. Robbins Tire & Rubber Co., 437 U.S. 214, 242 (1978).
295. Nat'l Archives & Records Admin. v. Favish, 541 U.S. 157,175 (2004) (citing CrawfordEl v. Britton, 523 U.S. 574, 585 (1998)).
296. Id. at 160.
297. ld. at 174-75.
298. Id.
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At some point, the judiciary will likely need to clarify exactly who
qualifies as a "relative" in a family-privacy rights dispute. The current
terminology is somewhat vague. The Supreme Court held that the FOIA
"recognizes surviving family members' right to personal privacy with
respect to their close relatives' death scene images."2 99 The Ninth Circuit

held that family-privacy protection applies to the "memory of the deceased
held by those tied closely to the deceased by blood or love." 3" The problem of defining "relatives" was first noted in 1951 by a Massachusetts state
court which, when faced with a family-privacy rights claim, observed:
"[I]t would be difficult to fix its boundaries.""3 1 The Sixth Circuit, hearing
a Tennessee family-privacy rights case, asked: "How distant a relative
could sue? At what relational distance does the danger of feigned claims
overcome the likelihood of real emotional distress?"3 2 This same
question will no doubt arise on the federal FOIA level, and it will present
an interesting challenge, given the ever-changing definition of what
constitutes a "family" in contemporary society. Still, the Court's
recognition of family-privacy makes sense.
The Favish court's sufficient reason test also reflects sound public
policy in requiring a FOIA requester to demonstrate that there is a
significant public interest in the requested information. This requirement
provides for a practical and meaningful balancing analysis, as prescribed
by Congress. Courts must now weigh the legitimate and competing values
of personal privacy and the public interest in open government.
However, the second prong of the "sufficient reason" test, which
compels the FOIA requester to show that disclosure would advance the
public interest, creates loopholes that could easily be exploited by federal
agencies with a myopic view of the public interest in disclosure. Congress
and courts have recognized that some agencies tend to be overly protective
of the information they possess and release it only when faced with legal
action.3 3 If these loopholes are eliminated, the second prong can contribute
to a meaningful balancing analysis. The solution lies with Congress. The
difficulties posed by the "sufficient reason" test's second prong can be
299. Id.
300. Favish, 541 U.S. at 163 (citing Favish v. Office of the Indep. Counsel, 217 F. 3d 1168,

1173 (2000)).
301. Kelley v. Post Publ'g Co., 98 N.E.2d 286, 287 (Mass. 1951).
302. Cordell v. Detective Publ'ns, Inc. 419 F.2d 989, 991-92 (1969); see also Swickard v.
Wayne County Med. Exam'r, 475 N.W.2d 304, 311 (Mich. 1991) (holding there is no relational
right to personal privacy in Michigan unless their own privacy is violated by "unjustifiable
publicity").
303. See, e.g., S.REP. No. 89-813, at 3 (1965); Dep't of Air Force v. Rose, 425 U.S. 352,362
(1976); EPA v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73, 80 (1973).
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remedied by a congressional amendment that clearly states that the public
interest in disclosure should not depend on whether information was
already released by government - regardless of how voluminous the
amount of information disclosed - or whether information was publicized
by other means. Rather, a disclosure decision should depend on the public
interest in the requested information itself.
Unfortunately, the Court-crafted "presumption of legitimacy" doctrine
offers no salvageable promise. This doctrine limits the scope of access to
public records under the FOIA and creates an obstacle that can stall
prevent historians
journalistic efforts to expose corruption and waste,
from filling important historical gaps and correcting the historical
record, 3°5 and block the general public from scrutinizing and evaluating its
government. Modem historical events, such as the Watergate scandal, the
illegal Iran-Contra arms-for-cash scheme, and the CIA's false claims of
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction, should teach that conferring a
"presumption of legitimacy" on governmental conduct can lead to
unfortunate consequences. Indeed, the logic of this doctrine is absurd when
applied as a condition of disclosure under the FOIA, which was expressly
intended as a check against governmental malfeasance, incompetence, and
inefficiency. The overarching theme throughout FOIA's extensive
legislative history is that in a participatory democracy, it is the public and not the government - that is best suited to scrutinize and evaluate
government operations and performance.

304. See Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 539 (1965) (noting that journalists have acted as "a
mighty catalyst in awakening public interest in governmental affairs, exposing corruption among
public officers and employees and generally informing the citizenry of public events and
occurrences").
305. For example, a 2001 FOIA request by the National Security Archive at George
Washington University revealed for the first time that President Gerald Ford and Secretary of State
Henry Kissinger had personally assured Indonesian leader Suharto that the United States would not
oppose an Indonesian takeover of East Timor. Ford and Kissinger had denied their assent to the
1975 invasion that left 200,000 dead in a brutal occupation that did not end until 1999. See Ford
and Kissinger Gave Green Light to Indonesia'sInvasion of East Timor, 1975: New Documents
Detail Conversations with Suharto, Dec. 6, 2001, available at http://www.gwu.edu/-nsarchiv/
NSAEBB/NSAEBB62/press.html (last visited May 17, 2005).

